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ABSTRACT
One concern with employer-based health insurance is job lock or the inability for
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Introduction

The United States Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), colloquially termed
“Obamacare,” on March 23, 2010. The ACA’s proponents in Congress and the White House
claimed that the ACA allows more people access to health insurance and reduces their
dependence on employer-provided insurance coverage, which in turn creates a more flexible and
efficient labor market. In response to a Congressional Budget Office report that the ACA reduces
employment, Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) stated that “the Affordable Care Act will
enable more than 2 million workers to escape job-lock—-the situation where workers remain tied
to employers for access to health insurance benefits” (Blake, 2014). One of the ACA’s most
prominent coverage-expanding features is the dependent mandate, which requires all private
insurance plans that offer dependent child coverage to allow that coverage to continue until the
dependent’s 26th birthday. (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2017)
When employees consider leaving a job to find one that better matches their skills, they
consider both the benefit their current job provides and the opportunity cost of staying in the job.
For young Americans, this option may be another job, an educational opportunity, or some other
activity that they perceive increases valuable human capital or lifetime earnings. One opportunity
cost of switching jobs is a change in or potential loss of employer-provided health insurance.
Workers could choose not to switch to a better match if they perceive that the alternative job’s
health insurance plan is of lesser quality, more expensive, or nonexistent. In 2016, an individual
employee’s health insurance coverage cost averaged $5,615, with workers contributing $951 of
these costs out of pocket (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2017). The Bureau of Labor
Statistics estimates that insurance costs contributed to 7.6 percent of total compensation for
private employees and 11.8 percent for state and local employees (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2017). Because of these high costs, many employees could feel locked into their jobs and do not
switch employers because of the cost of losing employer-provided health insurance.
Previous literature provides empirical support for the idea that individuals stay in jobs
because of health insurance. Madrian (1994) finds that individuals whose spouses have access to
1

insurance are 15–25 percent more likely to leave jobs than those without this coverage, and
Hamersma and Kim (2009) find that increases in Medicaid eligibility had a statistically significant
positive correlation with job turnover for unmarried women. Empirical evidence indicates that the
dependent mandate caused a substantial increase in the number of young adults with insurance
coverage. Further research also finds that the mandate decreased the participation of young adults
in the labor market (Antwi et al., 2013; Depew, 2015).
While these papers show that there is causal evidence that employer-based health
insurance may induce job lock, there are some limitations to generally used data sets. First, there
is considerable variability of salary and health benefits among jobs that may be unobservable to
the researcher.1 Gruber and Madrian (2004) survey the job lock literature and point out that there
is significant unobserved variation in firm size and health insurance plan generosity. For example,
small firms are less likely to offer extensive health plans and perhaps charge their workers higher
premiums than similar workers at larger firms or in the public sector. One contribution of this
paper is that we use data from the U.S. Army which means that all soldiers observed are covered
by the same insurance program (TRICARE) and must enroll.
Second, there are endogeneity2 concerns that the timing of when to leave a job could be
influenced by the policy change. Third, it is difficult to ascertain the health status of the worker
and ensure that our results are not being driven by differences in health rather than portability of
health insurance. Finally, it can be unclear in the data as to whether the worker leaves the firm of
their own choice or whether the firm laid off the worker. These unobserved factors could attenuate
the effects of the ACA (or policies that increase the portability of health insurance) toward zero.
The ideal experiment in this setting would be a situation where workers were paid equally
and have access to the same form of health insurance before the policy change. Also, it would be
helpful if the date that a worker must consider leaving the firm was set in advance of the policy
1 For example, the National Longitudinal Study of Youth and the Current Population Survey have indicators for
whether the worker has employer-sponsored health insurance, but no information on coverage or costs.
2 Bailey and Chorniy (2016) point out a number of concerns from the previous job lock literature such as using
married vs. single workers (i.e., Bansak and Raphael (2008) and Adams (2004)) or healthy vs. unhealthy workers
(i.e., Stroupe et al. (2001) and Bradley et al. (2012) as treatment and control groups. Bailey and Chorniy (2016) argue
that there is unobserved sorting that drives workers into either of these groups.
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and there was a clear decision point. Uniformity of worker health would ensure that the worker
decided to leave a firm because of insurance and not a negative health shock. Finally, a researcher
would want to ensure that workers were given the opportunity to stay but chose to leave, thus
signaling that they were locked into a particular job because of the inability to transfer health
insurance to their new careers.
U.S. Army data3 remedy several problems inherent in civilian workforce data. First, all
Army personnel have nearly identical compensation at each rank and inside each occupational
branch. We can easily control for those differences that may exist. One notable benefit the army
provides to soldiers at every rank is their health care network, which allows soldiers full medical
coverage at no out of pocket cost. Second, when soldiers enlist into the army, they set a contract
that expires usually in three to five years. Soldiers cannot submit a “two-week” notice and move
into the civilian sector without facing high penalties. In this study, we consider soldiers who set
their enlistment contracts before Congress passed the ACA. Third, all soldiers must pass stringent
health and fitness requirements and may be discharged due to poor health, fitness, or disability.
We can easily identify these individuals and have dropped them from our sample. Finally, when a
soldier’s contract expires, the army must first offer the soldier the opportunity to reenlist. If the
soldier was unable or unwilling to complete their duties or has performed poorly, the army will
not retain them. We condition our data on receiving an offer of reenlistment; thus, if a soldier
leaves in our sample it is by her own choice. While the army setting is different from other sectors
in the labor market, its unique characteristics allow us to avoid certain limitations that may exist
in previous studies and alleviate the concerns of unobserved insurance quality and worker health
status pointed out by Gruber and Madrian (2004) and Bailey and Chorniy (2016).
3 Others have studied the effects of access to health insurance on the labor supply decisions of veterans who have
already left the service. Boyle and Lahey (2010) use a policy change in the 1990s that expanded veteran eligibility
for access to the Veterans Affairs hospital network. The authors find that this expansion of coverage decreased labor
supply among lower education veterans, while college graduates were more likely to be self-employed. Boyle and
Lahey (2016) find similar results for spouses of affected veterans. Autor et al. (2016) use the expansion of Veterans
Affairs disability compensation to veterans exposed to Agent Orange as a natural experiment and find that veterans
with increased benefits reduced their labor supply. Coile et al. (2015) find similar effects to veterans given increases
in disability compensation of the early 2000s. Our paper contributes to this literature by exploring the effects of the
passage of the ACA on the labor supply decisions of active duty military members as opposed to those who had
previously separated from the military.
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Prior to the ACA, a young adult’s decision to leave the army would mean that they may
lose health care coverage. Because fully funded health care was not guaranteed outside the
military, soldiers may have assessed a low opportunity cost for reenlisting due to the high cost of
health care they may have incurred upon leaving the army. However, soldiers younger than 26 can
now leave the military at the end of their contact’s term and return to their parents’ insurance
plans. This paper hypothesizes that the ACA’s dependent insurance mandate causes enlisted
soldiers below age 26 to leave the army at a higher rate due to the decrease in health care costs
they now face outside the army. These lower health care costs increase the value of a soldier’s
next best option and the opportunity cost of reenlisting.
Our main estimates show that that the ACA reduced reenlistment rates by 1.3 percentage
points or 3.14 percent for enlisted soldiers ages 23–25. This result is robust to the addition of
various controls and home state of record fixed effects. We estimate various heterogeneous
treatment showing that soldiers with increased human capital are the most responsive to the
dependent mandate. We also conduct various placebo and robustness tests that use different
treatment groups and year specifications to show that our results are a product of the dependent
mandate and not contemporaneous year or age effects.
In our sample, the army offered 137,958 soldiers aged 23–26 the option to reenlist, with
54,316, or 53 percent, of those soldiers electing to reenlist. Our findings imply that the dependent
mandate reduced reenlistments by 3,255 soldiers. The costs to replace these soldiers include
training and recruitment as well as lost human capital within the army that decreases efficiency
and preparedness within units. This paper demonstrates that the ACA effectively changed
behavior in young adults and provides evidence of job lock within the army.
In addition, to better understand the extent of job lock in the military context, we test
whether soldiers leaving the army move to better opportunities in the labor force. To test this
hypothesis, we merge Post 9/11 GI Bill usage data to our enlistment records and find that veterans
that have access to their parents’ health insurance are more likely to use their GI Bill benefits.
These findings are important since turnover due to health insurance portability may increase a
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firm’s costs, but increased education and labor market opportunities are beneficial to the worker.
We find that a veteran with access to health insurance because of the dependent mandate is three
percent more likely to attend college on the GI Bill.
Following this introduction, Section 2 provides institutional details. Section 3 provides
background on job lock and the ACA’s effect on labor markets and explains the contribution this
paper makes to existing literature. Section 4 discusses the data, how it helps to overcome issues in
other data sets, and its limitations. Section 5 details our empirical model. Section 6 discusses
results including the heterogeneous treatment effects. Section 7 presents a host of placebo and
robustness checks. Section 8 summarizes results from our model for the effect of the ACA on the
uptake of the Post 9-11 GI Bill. Section 9 discusses the results and their generalizability to a
broader context of national security and labor market policy. Finally, Section 10 concludes.

2

Institutional Details Regarding Enlistment in the U.S. Army

The U.S. Army is composed of two distinctly different groups: officers and enlisted soldiers. the
army requires that officers hold bachelor’s degrees before receiving a commission, while enlisted
soldiers must be between 17 and 35 years old when they join and hold a high school diploma or
GED. Both officers and enlisted soldiers must meet baseline physical and medical requirements
before entering the military. These requirements create a population with similar health upon
entry. Those with chronic health conditions such as cancer, asthma, or diabetes are not admitted
or retained in the army.
Enlisted soldiers have two basic divisions: junior enlisted (comprised from ranks of E1 to
E3) and noncommissioned officers (E5 and above). Upon entering the army, they will be privates
(E1 to E3), after which they will receive a promotion to specialist (E4). Privates and specialists
are known as junior enlisted. After showing competence and leadership potential, qualified
junior-enlisted soldiers are promoted to the ranks of noncommissioned officers as a sergeant (E5
and above). Noncommissioned officers supervise lower-enlisted soldiers and ensure the soldiers
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carry out officers’ orders. Enlisted soldiers cannot advance into officer ranks without leaving and
attending Officer Candidate School, an ROTC detachment at a university, or the United States
Military Academy at West Point. One difference between enlisted soldiers and officers is that
officers do not sign the same contracts as enlisted soldiers. For this reason, we exclude officers
from our data. With rare exceptions, the army cannot hire laterally from the civilian workforce;
meaning that a new recruit needs to start at the bottom of the rank structure regardless of outside
experience. Thus, an increase in separation from the military comes at an increased training and
retention cost.
Branches, or occupational lanes, exist in both officer and enlisted ranks. There are 17
branches ranging from combat arms, such as armor and infantry, to logistic, such as quartermaster
and transportation. With relatively few exceptions, soldiers maintain membership in their
branches for the duration of their careers. While civilian jobs vary from employer to employer,
jobs within each branch are relatively uniform across the army for a given rank. Thus while the
tasks that infantry soldiers and helicopter mechanics perform certainly differ, the designators
assigned to each soldier’s file allow us to create controls that account for the differences in careers
across the military. Furthermore, the branch in which each soldier serves helps control for many
of the differences in compensation that exist within the army due to hazard or flight pay.
When enlisted soldiers join the army, they sign contracts that are set for specific terms of
service ranging from two to six years. Upon completion of the contract, the army will either
discharge the soldiers or give them an offer of reenlistment for another term of service. With rare
exceptions for issues such as medical problems, poor performance, or misbehavior, soldiers
cannot leave the army prior to finishing their contracts. These term contracts offer a unique way
to examine soldiers’ labor market decisions in a way that most private sector data cannot
replicate. Because soldiers must decide to reenlist at dates determined several years in advance,
term contracts force soldiers to uniformly evaluate compensation and opportunity costs before
continuing their military careers. These contracts eliminate problems inherent in civilian
workforce data where employees may never have to make a decision to leave or stay, and timing

6

for leaving or quitting jobs is endogenous.
While on active duty, soldiers enroll in TRICARE or the military health insurance plan.
TRICARE is available to active duty military, soldiers retired from the service4 and activated
Guard/Reserve members. TRICARE also covers dependents.5 While active duty service members
pay nothing out of pocket, however, choice may be limited to the military health care network.
For example, seeing a civilian specialist requires a referral by a military physician. Unlike many
jobs in the private sector, if a soldier does separate from the army her TRICARE benefits continue
premium-free for 180 days (a program called Transitional Assistance Management Program
[TAMP]). Thus the dependent mandate potentially offers younger soldiers health coverage after
their TAMP benefits expire.

3

Background on Job Lock and the ACA Dependent Mandate

3.1

Job Lock

Job lock affects labor supply decisions in three ways. First, it discourages individuals from
entrepreneurial ventures due to their consequent need for individually purchased insurance.
Second, it encourages employees to stay at a job even if a job for which they are a better match is
available in the labor market. This effect may also drive people into the labor force who would
otherwise retire or choose not to participate in the labor force. Third, it may increase individuals’
participation in the labor market on the intensive margin because they must obtain full time status
to qualify for employer-provided health insurance. This paper does not analyze job lock’s effect
on the intensive margin because the army is not a profession that offers hourly rates.
The findings in the literature regarding health insurance and job lock are mixed. Madrian
(1994) examines differences in job turnover rates conditional on whether the worker’s spouse has
4 Service

members must have completed 20 years on active duty to be considered retired.
TRICARE, one interesting aspect of tort law is that active duty personal cannot sue the government for
malpractice for procedures covered by TRICARE, but their dependents can sue due to negligence in their own health
care. Frakes and Gruber (2018) show that liability immunity toward active duty patients reduces inpatient spending by
5 percent without harming active duty patients.
5 Regarding
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access to employer-provided health insurance. The author finds that employees with insurance
coverage through their spouses are between 12 and 16 percentage points more likely to leave their
jobs than those whose spouses do not provide coverage. Monheit and Cooper (1994) use variables
such as job experience and education to estimate the likelihood that individuals will be able to
find a job that provides health insurance and then regress job turnover on this likelihood variable.
The authors show that the likelihood of gaining insurance is negatively correlated with the
likelihood of staying in a job. Gruber and Madrian (1994) study rollouts of state laws that gave
workers access to COBRA or continuation of health benefits for a short amount of time. The
authors find that worker mobility increased when state governments enacted these laws, showing
that health insurance portability is important for short-run transitions.
Other scholars’ findings suggest that employer-provided health insurance does not affect
labor supply. Holtz-Eakin (1994) examines one- and three-year transition rates using spousal
coverage strategy of Madrian (1994) but find no significant difference between those whose
spouses have insurance and those whose spouses do not. However, several issues exist with
workforce data that pose problems for scholars measuring job lock. Bailey and Chorniy (2016)
use data from the Current Population Survey to measure the effect of the dependent mandate on
job mobility of young adult workers using a method similar to ours. The authors find that the
ACA had no effect on job switching. The authors also point out a number of issues of studying
job lock that we hope to remedy by using the unique institutional setting of Army enlistments.

3.2

The ACA Dependent Mandate

The ACA’s dependent mandate was a large increase in coverage for young adults because it
allowed children up to the age of 26 to return to their parent’s health care plans at no extra cost.
The quickness and popularity of this aspect of the ACA have made the dependent mandate a
useful natural experiment to study the effect of health insurance coverage on a variety of health
and labor market outcomes. Barbaresco et al. (2015) find that despite the increase in insurance
coverage, the dependent mandate did not increase young adults’ use of preventative care. The
8

mandate did, however, increase the probability that young adults reported excellent self-assessed
health. However, Depew and Bailey (2015) find that the dependency mandate did increase
premiums for the young adult’s parents’ health insurance by 2.5–2.8 percent. Thus, while
evidence suggests that the mandate does not increase young adults’ actual health care use, it may
nonetheless cause young adults to feel more confident about their personal health. Colman and
Dave (2018) show that while overall health care usage may not have increased, young adults
substituted away from Emergency Department usage toward primary care physician visits.
McClellan (2017), using the Multiple Cause Mortality database, shows that the ACA dependent
mandate reduced mortality among young adults, while Daw and Sommers (2018) shows similar
results for infants.
Empirical evidence also suggests that the dependent mandate influenced young adults
behaviors beyond health care and health insurance. Abramowitz (2016) finds that the dependent
mandate influenced young adults to forgo marriage and cohabitate at higher rates because young
adults no longer depend on a potential spouse’s insurance plan to obtain health care coverage,
which consequently decreases cohabitation’s opportunity cost. Abramowitz (ming) finds that the
ACA dependent mandate also reduces the likelihood of giving birth and increases the use of
long-term hormonal contraception. If expanded insurance coverage options drive individuals to
change marriage and fertility decisions, it is likely that increased coverage may have affected
other decisions such as remaining in a job or furthering one’s education.6 Jung and Shrestha
(2018) find that the dependent mandate encourages more young adults to enroll in college full
time. We extend our findings in this paper to GI Bill usage and find similar results.
In this paper, we study how insurance portability affects young adults’ labor supply.
Previous research on this topic finds evidence that the higher uptake in parental health insurance
is associated with greater flexibility in the labor market. Depew (2015) studies dependent
mandates enacted on the state level before the ACA. He finds that state-dependent mandate laws
6 Various short-run effects of the ACA dependent mandate include increases in self-employment among disabled
workers (Bailey, 2017), lowered precautionary savings but increased savings in illiquid assets (Lee, 2016), taking on
lower wage jobs (Heim et al., 2018), increased leisure time (Lenhart and Shrestha, 2017), reduced drug and alcohol
usage Breslau et al. (2017), and increased contraception usage Trudeau and Conway (2018).

9

increased health insurance coverage of young adults and decreased the number of hours that
young adults worked. Antwi et al. (2013) use the ACA’s dependent mandate as a natural
experiment and also find that the dependent mandate reduces the probability that a young adult
works full time by 2.21 percentage points. They also find that the ACA reduced the number of
hours worked by 4.75 percent.
While previous literature analyzes the ACA’s effect on individual behaviors ranging from
health care utilization to cohabitation rates, this paper adds to existing literature with a unique
ability to assess the magnitude of job lock in the labor market. It measures the value that soldiers
place on health care benefits when they calculate the opportunity cost for staying in the army
using administrative data. However, the paper’s contributions go beyond the army. While the
army’s unique demographic and setting limit our ability to translate our findings to the civilian
population as a whole, evidence of job lock in the army suggests that job lock could possibly exist
outside the army as well. Because the army’s term contracts force soldiers to assess whether they
will choose to stay in or leave the service, they provide a compelling population to study how
employees value their compensation and provide further support for policymakers looking to
increase access to health care as a way to decrease friction in the labor market.

4

Data

This paper uses U.S. Army administrative data from the Office of Economic and Manpower
Analysis at West Point. In these data, we observe demographic and enlistment contract
characteristics for every soldier and the decision whether to reenlist in the army once their initial
contract ends. We limit our sample to soldiers aged 23–25 and 27–29 from years 2006 to 2013
who are on their first enlistment contract. Army ranks included in our sample are private (E1-E3),
specialist (E4), corporal (also E4), and sergeant (E5). Our sample excludes all officers and
enlisted soldiers above E5 due to differences in contracts, opportunity costs, and motivations to
reenlist. We also exclude anyone from our sample to whom the army did not offer a reenlistment
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option to ensure that we can distinguish labor supply from demand.
For our empirical model, we use the same age ranges and year groups as Barbaresco et al.
(2015) and Abramowitz (2016). We limit our sample to soldiers between aged 23–29 to mitigate
unobservable differences between treatment and control groups. Furthermore, some states already
had dependent mandate laws for individuals younger than 23. We also exclude soldiers who are
26 years old to clearly separate treatment and control groups. We chose the years 2006–2013 for
the same reasons as Barbaresco et al. (2015), by excluding data prior to 2006 to decrease the
likelihood that macroeconomic shocks will sway our sample’s job decisions. Depew (2015)
cautions against using data for years prior to 2007 because the Great Recession affected younger
people more than older people and thus increases the risk of introducing contemporaneous time
trends into the data. One limitation to our data, however, is that we cannot observe whether the
soldier’s parents are insured, which would mean that she would not have access to her parents’
plan under the ACA if she left the army. We want to avoid recession years because parents would
be less likely to be employed and have health insurance.
the army first offers reenlistment conditional on a soldier showing competence in her
duties and remaining physically fit. We can observe whether the army offered the soldier
reenlistment and we drop observations throughout the paper of those to whom the army decided
not to offer. This feature is advantageous to us because we can clearly distinguish demand side
effects (a firm firing or laying off an employee) from supply side effects (the employee choosing
to leave the firm for another opportunity). By conditioning our sample on those the army offers
reenlistment, we can clearly identify a labor supply effect. Also, in our data, we can observe the
exact date that the enlistment contract expires and the soldier leaves the army, thus we can
precisely code whether the contract expired before or after the ACA’s enactment and/or
implementation.
To avoid selection and compositional effects, we only consider soldiers who are
completing their first enlistment contract and thus are deciding whether to remain in the army
after an initial introduction. While our control group is a few years older, this sample selection
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allows us to compare soldiers who remain on the same career trajectory—that is, having achieved
the same rank in the same amount of service time or chosen the same occupational branch.
Comparing soldiers who are older but have completed multiple enlistment terms and remained in
the army would be inappropriate because of selection on unobservables. Thus, controlling for
rank and branch should allow us to compare equally rated soldiers, with the only difference being
that those in the control group are a few years older and thus not eligible for parental health
coverage. However, not controlling for rank and branch could cause us to compare soldiers who
did not advance as quickly or have a higher taste for military-specific tasks which would bias our
estimates upwards.
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the soldiers in our sample. We observe,
conditional on being offered reenlistment, that 54 percent of soldiers reenlist. We also find that a
majority of our sample is of rank E4 (specialist or corporal) who are the most junior
noncommissioned officers. Another 23 percent of our sample is of rank E5 (sergeant). This
distribution of rank is not surprising because we observe soldiers at the end of their enlistment
contract and since they were offered reenlistment, they were promoted in a timely manner.
Not surprisingly, given our identification strategy, the average age of our sample is 24.86
years. Our sample is also representative of the army as a whole: 67 percent of the soldiers are
white, 15 percent are black, and 12 percent are Hispanic. The soldiers in our sample are also 87
percent male. The education level of our sample is also representative of the army given that a
soldier must have at least a high school degree to enlist, but those with a four-year college degree
are more likely to receive a commission as an officer. In our sample, 74 percent of soldiers have
only a high school degree and 13 percent hold a GED. However, our sample does show that a
little more than 10 percent of enlisted soldiers have either attended some college or completed a
four-year degree.
Figure 1 and Table 2 provide preliminary evidence that our assumption of parallel trends
holds. Figure 1 displays reenlistment rates for soldiers who were offered a choice to reenlist, and
shows a distinct downward shift starting in 2010 for younger soldiers. Table 2 shows covariate
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balance for our treatment and control groups before and after the passage of the ACA. Standard
deviations are included in parentheses under the means. Both groups have relatively similar
reenlistment rates, with 56 percent of soldiers reenlisting before the ACA in both treatment and
control groups. Enlistment rates drop to 52 percent for the treatment group and 55 percent for the
control group after the ACA’s passage. All means for control variables and standard deviations
are similar across time periods and especially among demographic variables. The difference in
college graduates is notable: almost no one in the treatment group has a college degree, while
over 10 percent of the soldiers in the control group do. This difference is understandable since the
control group is older.

5

Econometric Methods

We estimate the causal effect of the ACA’s dependent mandate using the following difference in
differences model:

Reenlistigst = β1 Treatg + β2 PostACAt + β3 (Treatg × PostACAt ) + Xigst β + ζs + εigst

(1)

where Reenlist is whether individual, i, of treatment group, g, with home state of record state, s,
in year t reenlists for a second contract. Treatg is a dummy variable that indicates whether a
soldier is in the 23–25 year old treatment group. Postt is a dummy variable that indicates whether
the soldier’s enlistment contract expires after the ACA’s enactment.7 β3 is the
difference-in-differences coefficient of interest that estimates the causal effect of the dependent
mandate on the treatment group’s reenlistment rates.
The vector Xigst contains exogenous demographic and military controls such as gender,
race, and education level. All these factors influence the soldier’s opportunity cost of staying in
7 In

Section 7.2, we follow the logic of Antwi et al. (2013) and separate the enactment and implementation of the
ACA. We find our results are robust to this specification.
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the army. We also include various military-related controls such as branch and rank. Occupational
branches within the army are assigned when soldiers first enlist and determine the type of work a
soldier will do within the army. Jobs range from frontline combat tasks—such as infantry, armor,
or field artillery—to cyber operations and logistical supply chain support. A soldier’s branch may
influence his labor market opportunity outside the army because the human capital and skills that
soldiers receive in each branch vary.
We also include state home of record fixed effects (ζs ) in our model because states have
varying policies on whether a young adult could return to her parents’ health insurance.8 Also,
there is some variation in the maximum age limit for a young adult to be eligible to be covered.
Since many veterans return to their home state of record, we want to control for any variation in
labor market opportunities. We also choose to cluster at the state level because of the various
state-level policies that could explain enlistment and reenlistment. These policies include
generosity in public health insurance and opportunities for higher education. We feel that if these
policies are creating a correlation between soldiers from the same state, then clustering at the
home state level would be appropriate.
Finally, one threat to our identification could be the use of bonuses to encourage soldiers
to reenlist, particularly those that the army would like to retain. Borgschulte and Martorell (ming)
and Greenstone et al. (2017) show that soldiers are quite responsive to bonus, especially when
faced with economic downturns or the in the face of increased mortality risk. Swings in
reenlistment could be caused by changes in bonuses that could have happened contemporaneously
to the enactment of the ACA. Given monthly recruiting targets, bonuses are equal for any soldier
of the same rank, branch, and year-month of contract expiration. To understand what effects
bonuses may have on our findings, we estimate an alternative model to the one above by including
rank by branch by year-month fixed effects. Figure 2 shows that even at this cell size, there is
considerable variation in the percentage of soldiers in our treatment group.
8 Illinois

has a provision that allows young veterans to return to their parents’ health insurance up to age 30.
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6

Results

Table 3 presents the difference-in-differences estimates for the effects of the ACA’s passage on
the enlistment rates of soldiers aged 23–25. We use several models that include various soldier
characteristics to analyze the interaction coefficient’s stability and ensure that our estimates are
not dependent on other factors that may affect soldiers reenlistment decisions. Following a
discussion of our results, we conduct several placebo tests and robustness checks to show that our
results are stable to alternative specifications and events independent from the ACA’s passage.

6.1

Primary Results

Table 3 shows the results for four models that include various controls. Column 1 is a
difference-in-differences estimator with no exogenous controls. Column 2 introduces state home
of record fixed effects to account for any state-level policies that may affect health care coverage
or a soldier’s reenlistment decision. Column 3 adds the vector of demographic and military
controls. This model controls for the soldier’s race, gender, education level, rank, and
occupational branch. Finally, Column 4 addresses concerns about the influence of bonuses on
reenlistment rates by including branch by rank by year-month fixed effects.
All regressions in Table 3 are conditioned on whether a soldier had a choice to reenlist in
the army at the end of their contracts. The interaction term in our model provides the causal
estimate of the dependent mandate’s effect on the reenlistment decisions of soldiers younger than
26. Column 1 shows a baseline estimate of −0.026, interpreted as a 2.6 percentage point decrease
in reenlistment rates for the treatment group. The coefficient on the interaction is highly stable
across the first three models, decreasing only by 0.2 percentage points across in the third column
with the addition of exogenous controls. Since roughly 52 percent of our sample reenlists when
offered, our results translate into a 5 percent decrease in the reenlistment rate because of the
dependent mandate in the ACA. If we adjust our results for potential changes in the bonus
structure with the addition of branch by rank by year-month fixed effects, our estimates shrink to
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a coefficient of −0.017. This estimate represents a 1.7 percentage point reduction in the
probability of reenlistment or 3.2 percent. While the magnitude of the coefficient does decrease, it
remains statically significant.
The other advantage to using branch and rank fixed effects is that according to Army
doctrine, soldiers of the same rank, occupational branch, and term of service should be treated
equally. the army uses this principle to decide who should deploy, which soldiers should be let go
during a troop drawdown, any changes in recruitment standards, and which incentives to offer
during a troop build up. These controls, combined with our specification with branch by rank by
year-month fixed effects should control for any of these fluctuations. Thus, in each specification,
we are comparing soldiers of the same rank and same occupational branch, so any of these troop
level changes or probability of deployment should not bias our results.

6.2

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

One limitation of our data is that we cannot observe the health insurance status of a soldier’s
parents.9 Therefore, we conduct subsample analysis across various demographic groups whose
parents are most likely to have health insurance. We test for heterogeneous treatment effects
across gender, race, and education levels to examine whether specific populations within our data
respond differently to the ACA dependent mandate, since racial minorities and lower-income
families are less likely to be covered by employer-sponsored insurance. (Lillie-Blanton and
Hoffman, 2005; Card et al., 2008), and Breslau et al. (2018) show that white parents are more
likely to have health insurance than black parents. Higher levels of education may allow
individuals to use their parents’ health insurance to pursue better options outside the military
(Courtemanche et al., 2016; Grossman, 1972). The opportunity cost of reenlistment may also be
9 This

data limitation is not confined just to our data, it is present in other data sources that researchers have used
to examine the effects of the ACA. For example, the American Community Survey only asks about the source of
the individual’s health coverage (i.e., employer-sponsored, publicly provided, or from the military). Interestingly, the
American Community Survey treats TRICARE as employer-sponsored health insurance while the Current Population
Survey treats TRICARE as publicly provided. Holder and Day (2017) use the American Community Survey to show
that after Congress passed the ACA, younger veterans are less likely to be uninsured and more likely to be covered by
employer-sponsored health insurance.
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lower for soldiers with lower education levels since fewer opportunities are available to them
outside the army. To test for results specific to these populations we estimate regression models
with all controls and use subsample analysis with regards to race, gender, and education level.
First, we reestimate our model given a soldier’s AFQT scores. The AFQT is a helpful
measure of a soldier’s cognitive ability and can be a good indicator for whether the soldier’s
parents have health insurance (since high ability, young workers may come from a background
with higher-ability parents) and the extent of a soldier’s options outside the military. Military
occupations that have high value in the civilian workforce are generally reserved for those soldiers
enlisting with a higher AFQT score. Table 4 displays results from reestimating our primary model
for soldiers with AFQT scores below the 50th percentile, above the 50th percentile, and above the
75th percentile. We find that soldiers with higher cognitive ability are more willing to exit the
army when they have the opportunity to use their parents’ health insurance. For soldiers whose
AFQT scores are below the median we find a small but statistically insignificant increase in
reenlistment after the passage of the ACA. However, when we consider soldiers above the median
AFQT score, reenlistment drops by 2.4 percentage points, or 4.42 percent. The magnitude of the
effect increases as AFQT scores increase. When we consider only soldiers with an AFQT score
of greater than the 75th percentile, we estimate a 3.9 percentage point decrease in reenlistment,
translating to a loss of 7.19 percent of very high ability soldiers. However, it should be noted that
these two coefficients are not statistically significant from each other.
Table 5 displays the results of our primary regression model with all controls using race,
gender, and educational subsamples. The interaction term’s coefficient shows the responsiveness
to the ACA’s dependent mandate within each subpopulation. Conditioning on race only provides
a statistically significant result of a decrease of 3.20 percentage points in the probability of
reenlistment for white soldiers, although the coefficient estimate for Hispanics is almost identical
but not statistically significant. The coefficient for black soldiers shrinks to a −0.016 and is no
longer statistically significant. Along gender lines, the confidence intervals for the estimates for
male and female soldiers overlap enough that we cannot claim that the coefficients are statistically

17

different from each other. However, the estimates do suggest that the soldier’s education level will
affect their responsiveness to the dependent mandate. Specifically, they suggest that individuals
are more responsive to the dependent mandate as their educational attainment increases. When
we limit the regression to only students with at least some college experience, the effect is a 4.1
percentage point decrease in reenlistment rates, while among high school graduates the effect is
only 1.3 percentage points. These results should be treated with caution, however, because there
are many reasons that white males with higher education attainment may leave the army at higher
rates other than access to their parent’s health insurance (for example, better labor market
opportunities or college access).

7

Placebo and Robustness Checks

7.1

Placebo Tests—Examining Year and Age Effects

We conduct placebo tests to ensure our result is only identified in the presence of the policy
change and the treatment group. These placebo tests are designed to determine whether there are
contemporaneous effects with the years and age brackets drive our results. Threats to our
identification include contemporaneous policies such as changes in troop levels due to the
military draw-down in Iraq and Afghanistan or macroeconomic trends. One could also claim that
younger soldiers are always less likely to reenlist, causing age to drive our results. We address
these concerns by constructing multiple placebo regressions. First, we change the enactment year
to 2008 and only use data from 2006–2009, years before the passage of the ACA. Second, we
code 27–30-year-olds as “treated” and 32–34-year-olds as “control” to follow the method
proposed by Slusky (2017).10 Last, we compare soldiers aged 19–20 with those aged 21–22. The
logic behind these placebo tests is that if just the year or age range drive our results, and not the
union between the two, then it is highly unlikely that our results are the product of the dependent
10 Barbaresco

et al. (2015), Depew (2015), and Abramowitz (2016) all use a similar placebo method to test the
robustness of their respective estimates.
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mandate of the ACA as opposed to trends not related to the policy.
The results from the placebo tests are shown in Table 6. First, we show that our results are
not a product of comparing early years (when combat activity was highest) against later years
(when combat activity and deployments had slowed) by limiting our sample to observations from
2009 to 2012, with years post 2010 as our treatment. This specification also ensures that we have
similar power in our baseline analysis with our pre-ACA placebo test. We estimate that the
dependent mandate reduced reenlistment rates by 2.5 percentage points for those eligible for their
parents’ health insurance. Next, we consider years strictly before 2010 to see if our result is
primarily driven by age differences and not the ACA. We have a few observations before 2006 but
do not include them in this robustness check for fear of having compositional changes in the types
of enlistees before and after the terrorist attacks of 2001. We split these four years evenly, using
years after 2007 as our ”treated” years. We find that our placebo policy year had no effect on
reenlistment rates, giving evidence for our primary results. Third, we consider older soldiers only
and pretend that soldiers aged 27–30 were treated by the ACA and use soldiers aged 32–34 as the
control. We find that the placebo age requirement “caused” a 0.4 percentage point, statistically
insignificant increase in the reenlistment rate. Finally, we compare soldiers aged 18–20 to those
21–22 and pretend that 18–20-year-olds were eligible for the dependent mandate and those 21–22
were not. One limitation of this test is that there are very few soldiers in the “treatment” group
compared to the baseline results. Since we are considering reenlistment and the average
enlistment contract is four years, the only soldiers who would be in our treatment group are those
who joined the army when they were either 17 or 18 and just graduated from high school and
agreed to a two-year enlistment contract. Also, the bulk of this treatment group (77.53 percent) is
20 years old. For these reasons, this placebo treatment group is very different from the
23–25-year-olds in our baseline specification. However, for completeness, we estimate this
placebo test and find that soldiers who are 18 to 20 years old at the end of their contracts are 5.7
percentage points more likely to reenlist (but not statistically significant), showing that we cannot
replicate our baseline findings for 23–25-year-olds using data from younger soldiers.
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7.2

Robustness Check-Enactment and Implementation of the ACA

One question from the ACA literature is how to handle 2010 since Congress passed the ACA in
March of 2010 and implemented the dependent mandate in September of 2010. To ensure, that
we treat 2010 correctly and ensure that this transition year is not biasing or driving our estimates,
we conduct two robustness checks in line with Antwi et al. (2013). In our data, we can see the
exact day that the soldier’s enlistment contract expired, allowing us to explore the effects of the
timing of enactment and implementation of the ACA. First, we drop 2010 from our sample.
Second we follow the example of Antwi et al. (2013) by estimating:

Reenlistigst =

γTreatg + σ Enactt + δ Implementt +
β1 (Treatg × Implementt ) + β2 (Treatg × Enactt ) +Xigst β + ζs + εigst

where Enactt is an indicator for whether a soldier’s contract expired after Congress passed the
ACA but before the dependent mandate was implemented, and Implementt is an indicator for
whether the soldier’s enlistment contract expired after the date that the parental mandate took
effect.
Table 7 displays the results from both of these checks. As a reference, we include the
baseline results in Column (1). Column (2) displays results for the baseline specification with the
exception that we have omitted all enlistment contracts that expired during 2010 from our sample.
We find that omitting 2010 does not affect our results in any significant way. Column (3) shows
the estimates for splitting 2010 into pre-ACA, postenactment, and postimplementation periods.
We find that the period after the dependent mandate’s implementation is driving our baseline
results, while the coefficient associated with the time period between enactment and
implementation is slightly smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. These results are in
line with estimates by Antwi et al. (2013).
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7.3

Robustness Check-Controlling for Youth Unemployment, War on
Terror Casualties, and Medicaid Expansion States

One concern with our baseline estimates is that Congress passed the ACA in 2010 during the
Great Recession and the tail-end of the surge in Iraq and the beginning of a similar troop surge in
Afghanistan. These two events could explain the drop in reenlistment for younger soldiers after
2010 instead of the availability of health insurance through the soldier’s parents. Also, the
passage of the ACA made funds available from the federal government to states to expand
Medicaid. While most states did not expand Medicaid until after our sample window, Medicaid
expansion is a good proxy for the presence of other publicly provided health insurance programs.
To address these concerns, we merge the annual, state level, average unemployment rate for
workers aged 18–25 and the total number of troop casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan (as a proxy
for combat intensity and danger) to our data. We also created an indicator for whether the
soldier’s state home of record expanded Medicaid. We include these three indicators with our
baseline specification and additionally interact the treatment effect with these indicators to allow
for the possibility that younger soldiers were more highly influenced by any of these events.
Table 8 presents results for controlling for the unemployment rate for younger adults and
for troop causalties from Iraq and Afghanistan. In Column (1), we include the annual, average
unemployment rate for each year for workers aged 18–25. We find that while the unemployment
rate is positively correlated with reenlistment, the estimate is imprecise and has no effect on our
baseline findings. In column (2) we interact the treatment group with the unemployment rate to
allow for the possibility that younger soldiers react differently to increased unemployment than
older soldiers and find similar results. Next, we add combat-related causalities from the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan to control for decreased reenlistments due to increased risk. Column (3)
displays the results from this specification. We find that annual combat deaths had no effect on
reenlistment rates, and the addition of an interaction term with our treated age group interacted
with combat deaths only increased the magnitude and precision of our main estimate. Finally,
Column (5) indicates whether the soldier is from a Medicaid expansion state. We find that neither
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Medicaid expansion nor its interaction with the treatment group affects our results.

7.4

Robustness Check- Pre-ACA Parental Mandate States

Finally, we consider whether state-level dependent mandates that existed before the passage of the
ACA affected our results. Gamino (2018) shows that failure to consider preexisting, state-level
mandate laws can bias results. He also shows that there exists large variation in the generosity of
these laws and the timing of their enactment. For example, many states have different maximum
ages that a child can remain on their parent’s health insurance, and many states vary regarding
whether the child has to be single, a full-time student, or disabled. Pertinent to this study, Illinois
allowed veterans leaving the military to remain on their parent’s health insurance plans as long as
they were under the age of 30. We conduct a similar robustness check as Gamino (2018) and
Antwi et al. (2013) by dropping states with preexisting laws; the only difference is we code states
with laws that require a dependent to be a full-time student or disabled as a zero since these laws
would not apply to active duty personal considering exiting the military. However, our results are
similar when we use the same states as the previously cited literature.
Table 9 displays results from each of these robustness checks. Column (1) displays the
baseline model for comparison. In Column (2), we drop all soldiers from Illinois since before the
ACA, veterans could return to the parents’ health insurance. We find that dropping Illinois only
slightly increased the magnitude of our result without affecting precision. Next, we drop states
that had preexisting dependent mandate laws to ensure that our results are not driven by soldiers
from these states. Column (3) shows the results from this specification. We find that our baseline
result does shrink to a decrease of 2.0 percentage points, but this result is still statistically
significant. Column (4) shows our specification using a subsample of soldiers only from states
that had preexisting laws. Here, we find that our ACA effect increases such that the ACA
decreased reenlistment by 3.0 percentage points. However, when comparing the two
specifications, neither coefficient is statistically significant. One reason that our effect is found in
both the subsample with or without states with preexisting laws is that soldiers are not necessarily
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(and in most cases are not) living in their home states of record. Active duty military can also
declare residency in either their home state or any state they have lived in while serving in the
military. The active duty military population therefore is probably less influenced by preexisting
state laws than other populations studied in the literature.

8

Results for Post 9/11 GI Bill Uptake

Our results show that the dependent mandate made it more difficult for the army to retain young
adults. While this result may show that recruitment and retainment costs may increase for the
military (and perhaps other firms), it is unclear whether the portability of health insurance will
lead veterans to better long-run outcomes. Since the passage of the ACA is still relatively recent,
it will be difficult to measure its effects of some outcomes such as career satisfaction and
mid-career wages. One outcome that could be a good proxy for an enhanced career path is
whether a soldier attends college. Since most enlisted soldiers have only high school diplomas,
college attendance would indicate whether the availability of health insurance increases education
opportunities and thus, arguably, increased labor market outcomes.
One good indicator of college enrollment among veterans is whether the veteran used her
Post 9/11 GI Bill benefit. Signed by President George W. Bush in 2008, the Post 9/11 GI Bill was
one of the largest expansions of federal financial aid. It eliminated the need for veterans to opt
into the GI Bill and removed requirements of service members to make contributions to the GI
Bill while on active duty. The bill also made every military member who had served at least three
years after September 11, 2001, eligible for four years of college tuition including a monthly
stipend and housing costs. Also, the Post 9/11 GI Bill allowed veterans to transfer these benefits
to a spouse or children.
We test this hypothesis by merging our sample with data from the VA (which administers
the GI Bill) and reestimate the same specification as before. In these data, we can observe which
soldiers used the GI Bill and the amounts that the VA paid on their behalf to institutions. We code
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GI Bill usage as a one if the VA expended positive amounts of aid and zero otherwise. As before,
we include various demographic information and state fixed effects to control for state-level, time
in-varying characteristics such as scholarships for veterans or generous merit aid programs.
We use the same sample as in our previous estimates to avoid selection and compositional
effects of those soldiers leaving the army. Soldiers who are active duty can still enroll in college
and use their Post 9/11 GI Bill; however, we worry that conditioning our sample on those leaving
the service may cause the interpretation of our results to be unclear. We do not want to extend our
causal claims too far and present these results for the Post 9/11 GI Bill as descriptive.
Table 10 contains estimates for the effect of the dependency mandate on Post 9/11 GI Bill
usage. Column (1) displays a baseline regression with only an indicator for a soldier between 23
and 25 years old, a dummy variable for the policy change, and the interaction effect. Using this
specification, we estimate that soldiers who have access to their parents’ health insurance are one
percentage point more likely to use their GI Bill benefits. In our sample, we observe that 53
percent of soldiers use these benefits, so our point estimates translate to around a 2.1 percent
increase. Columns 2–4 show that our estimate is robust to adding state home of record fixed
effects, exogenous demographic controls, rank fixed effects, and occupational branch fixed
effects.
While longer-run outcomes would be helpful, these outcomes are currently not feasible
since the ACA is still relatively new. However, our results show that the ACA did encourage more
soldiers to attend college. These results are also helpful for assessing the social welfare of the
dependent mandate of the ACA. Since our job lock results show that the ACA did reduce the
number of soldiers remaining in the army, it does appear that the policy change helps veterans
attain more education after leaving. Thus the dependent mandate (and the corresponding
increased portability in health insurance) may increase recruiting and retention costs for
employers, but increase potential wages and educational outcomes for the worker.
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9

Discussion

In this paper, we estimate the effect of the dependent mandate of the ACA on job lock in the U.S.
Army. By comparing young soldiers aged 23–25 who are eligible to return to their parents’ health
care plans to those just barely above the maximum age cutoff, we show that the ACA reduced
reenlistment by 2.4 percentage points, or around 4.4 percent. After controlling for possible
reenlistment bonuses, this magnitude drops to 1.7 percentage points, or around 3.13 percent. This
reduction in reenlistment is more dramatic for those soldiers who are white, with higher AFQT
scores, or at least some college experience.
One question regarding this study is, How applicable are these findings to the general
population, particularly low income, less healthy, and underrepresented minorities whom job lock
might affect the most? While everyone in our sample is healthy enough for military service (since
they were all offered reenlistment), the soldiers in our sample are less white and more male than
the U.S. population. Also, enlisted soldiers in the army tend to come from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds (Kleykamp, 2006). Thus our sample could be seen as a lower-bound estimate
because the presence of job lock among a younger, healthy population would only be greater
among workers with illness or other challenges. If we can find job lock in a population of workers
that are healthy and enjoy generous health benefits, then it is probable that job lock exists in
populations that are less healthy and thus more dependent on maintaining employer-based health
insurance.
Our results are similar, however, to other papers that use a more general population.
Antwi et al. (2013) find that the probability of working full time drops by 2.21 percentage points,
and the number of hours worked also drops by 4.75 percent after the implementation of the ACA.
These results show that our findings are not too far removed from the previous literature, and are
somewhat lower when compared to a paper that uses a more representative sample like the Survey
of Income and Program Participation. However, our findings are helpful for future research in this
area because the nature of the enlistment contract and the nature of Army allows us to avoid some
potential concerns of endogeneity and clearly identify supply effects as opposed to an employer
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reducing its workforce because of increased health care costs as a result of the ACA.
Another difference between a military and civilian population is risk tolerance. There is
actually a significant literature regarding the risk preferences and discount rates of service
members and their civilian counterparts. While active duty, military members are less risk averse
and have higher discount rates than civilians Warner and Pleeter (2001); Simon et al. (2015), a
soldier’s risk preferences do follow general population trends. Bell et al. (2018) solicit risk
preferences in a variety of hypothetical scenarios among West Point cadets. They find that West
Point cadets exhibit risk-averse behavior, particularly when considering financial risk. These
results could imply that military members are still risk averse regarding their own health and
financial well-being. Ault (2003) argues that risk aversion has been growing in the military and
could actually prove to be detrimental in future conflicts. Overall, however, military members are
less risk averse than civilians, so we would expect that our results may be smaller than civilians
with similar incentives and could be considered a lower bound when compared to the general
population.

10

Conclusion

The ACA’s dependent provision was meant to increase social welfare and decrease financial
threats to young adults (Goldman, 2013). While research shows that insurance coverage among
young adults increased, it is less clear that this coverage improved health care utilization and
outcomes (Barbaresco et al., 2015). In this study, we estimate the effect of the dependent mandate
on job switching by using the unique characteristics of the U.S. Army’s reenlistment process.
This scenario allows us to avoid certain sources of endogeneity such as unobserved health status,
variation in salary and health insurance generosity, the timing of job changing, and differentiation
or labor demand or supply shocks. We avoid these potential pitfalls since all soldiers in our
sample have passed rigorous physical fitness qualifications, are paid equally conditional on rank
and occupational branch, are covered by TRICARE, set contract expiration dates before the
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passage of the ACA, and have been offered the opportunity to reenlist.
We employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy that compares enlisted
soldiers aged 23–25 with those aged 27–29 and who are completing the first enlistment at the
ranks of E1 to E5 before and after President Obama signed the ACA in 2010. We find that the
ACA’s dependent mandate decreases soldier reenlistments among 23–25-year-olds by 4.4 percent.
We also find that these results are strongest among populations whose parents are most likely to
have health insurance and among soldiers with the highest opportunity cost of reenlistment such
as those with some college experience. For robustness, we include branch by rank by year-month
fixed effects to control for changes in reenlistment bonuses. After these controls, our estimates
show a reduction of 1.7 percentage points or 3.13 percent. Given our sample size of 137,958
enlistment contracts, our results suggest that 3,255 soldiers left the army when given access to
their parents’ health insurance via the ACA.
While the army has a very distinct labor structure and attracts a different type of worker
than traditional firms, our findings show that the ACA did increase turnover rates among workers
which can be costly to the firm. We show that an economically significant number of soldiers,
whom the army wants to retain, left because of outside access to health insurance. Beyond losing
valuable human capital, the army may also expend resources to train new recruits. These results
show that the army needs to adjust its appeal now that health insurance is no longer a strong
selling point to many young adults. While the dependent mandate was intended to improve social
welfare among young Americans, it has unintended consequences for the Department of Defense
that affect the nation’s national security and budgetary considerations. Firms in the private sector
will arguably face similar recruitment and retention costs.
While our results may be discouraging for the army, they may be positive for individuals
and for the labor market as a whole. We provide evidence that the ACA decreased labor market
frictions from job lock. To test whether portability of health insurance is welfare enhancing for
the individual, we use data on Post 9/11 GI Bill usage as a proxy to whether a veteran attended
college after leaving the army. We find that younger veterans who have access to their parents’
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health insurance are 3 percent more likely to use the Post 9/11 GI Bill. These results, combined
with the 3.13 percent reduction in soldiers remaining in the army, show that the dependent
mandate may be costly for employers, with increased turnover and decreased retention. However,
the policy change may be beneficial for workers who may attend college at higher rates and
pursue better job matches and more satisfying career paths.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics

Reenlisted
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
Age
White
Black
Hispanic
Male
GED
High school
Some college
College grad
Graduate degree
Ever married
No. of dependents
Observations

Mean Standard dev
0.54
0.50
0.00
0.07
0.01
0.10
0.08
0.27
0.68
0.47
0.23
0.42
24.86
1.89
0.67
0.47
0.15
0.36
0.12
0.33
0.87
0.34
0.13
0.34
0.74
0.44
0.07
0.25
0.03
0.17
0.00
0.03
0.48
0.50
0.96
1.16
146,458

Min
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
23.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Max
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
29.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
10.00

NOTE: Data come from the Office of Economic and Manpower
Analysis and reflect soldiers aged 23–29 whose first enlistment
contracts expired between 2007–2013, and who the army offered reenlistment.
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Figure 1: Reenlistments from Sample 2007–2013. This figure shows the parallel trends of reenlistment around the policy change. Our treatment group is soldiers aged 23–25 and our control
group contains soldiers aged 27–29. This figure shows that reenlistment rates were very similar
before the passage of the Affordable Care Act, but diverged afterward.
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Table 2: Covariate Balance across Treatment and Control Groups
Variable

Pre-ACA
23–25
27–29
years old years old
(1)
(2)
Reenlistments
0.56
0.56
(0.49)
(0.49)
Age
23.86
27.81
(0.80)
(0.80)
Male
0.87
0.87
(0.33)
(0.33)
White
0.69
0.68
(0.46)
(0.47)
Black
0.13
0.13
(0.34)
(0.34)
Hispanic
0.13
0.12
(0.33)
(0.33)
College graduate
0.00
0.11
(0.06)
(0.31)
High school graduate
0.77
0.57
(0.42)
(0.50)
AFQT score
59.25
64.81
(19.27)
(20.98)

Diff.

23–25
years old
(2) - (1)
(3)
0.00
0.52
(0.50)
3.95
23.85
(0.80)
0.00
0.87
(0.34)
−0.01
0.67
(0.47)
0.00
0.16
(0.37)
−0.01
0.12
(0.33)
0.10
0.00
(0.07)
−0.20
0.79
(0.41)
5.56
58.49
(19.03)

Post-ACA
27–29
Diff.
years old
(4)
(4) - (3)
0.55
0.03
(0.50)
27.8
3.95
(0.80)
0.87
0.00
(0.34)
0.66
0.00
(0.47)
0.16
0.00
(0.37)
0.12
−0.01
(0.32)
0.10
0.10
(0.30)
0.58
−0.21
(0.49)
63.66
5.17
(20.33 )

Final
Diff.
(4 - 3) - (2 - 1)
−0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
−0.01
−0.39

NOTE: Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 display means for treatment and control groups in the pre and posttreatment
periods with standard deviation in parentheses. Final “difference” column reports the differences in the
differences in means for groups aged 23–25 and 27–29 over the period of 2008–2012. The first time period is
prior to the Affordable Care Act (2008–2009) and the second is after the Affordable Care Act (2011–2012).
We exclude 26-year-olds to create a clear separation between treatment and control groups.
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Figure 2: Histogram of Branch by Rank by Year-Month Fixed Effects This figure shows variation in percentage of soldiers in each branch by rank by year-month fixed effects who were aged
23–25, meaning that they are considered “treated” in our quasi-experimental design. This variation
is important to show that we can still identify an effect even with this very specific fixed effect.
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Table 3: Regression Results for Soldier Reenlistment
(1)
Reenlisted

(2)
Reenlisted

(3)
Reenlisted

(4)
Reenlisted

−0.026∗∗∗
(0.006)

−0.026∗∗∗
(0.006)

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)

−0.017∗∗∗
(0.006)

State FEs

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Exog. controls

No

No

Yes

Yes

Rank by branch by month FEs

No

No

No

Yes

Variable
23–25 years × Post ACA

Observations
138,216
138,216
138,040
137,958
2
R
0.006
0.022
0.070
0.196
Standard Errors Clustered at the State Home of Record Level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
NOTE: Regression results in the interaction row estimate the dependent mandate’s
effect on reenlistment rates for soldiers aged 23–25 after the law passed in March,
2010. Demographic controls include ethnicity, gender, marital status and number of
dependents. Education controls are for level of education attained. Army controls
include soldiers’ rank, contract terms, and occupational branch. In our sample, 54.27
percent of soldiers reenlist conditional on the army offering reenlistment.
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Table 4: Regression Results for Soldier Reenlistment by AFQT Score
(1)
AFQT < 50th
Reenlisted

(2)
AFQT≥50th
Reenlisted

(3)
AFQT≥75th
Reenlisted

0.012
(0.011)

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.007)

−0.039∗∗∗
(0.011)

State FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Exog. controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

23–25 years × post ACA

Observations
44,443
90,728
35,018
2
R
0.219
0.159
0.178
Standard Errors Clustered at the State Home of Record Level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
NOTE: Regression results in the interaction row estimate the dependent
mandate’s effect on reenlistment rates for soldiers aged 23–25 after the law
passed in March 2010. Demographic controls include ethnicity, gender, and
education level. In our sample, 54.27 percent of soldiers reenlist conditional
on the army offering reenlistment. We use data from 2007–2013 unless
otherwise noted.

Table 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Variable

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
White
Black Hispanic
Male
Female Some college
Post-ACA ×
−0.032** −0.016 −0.031 −0.023** −0.022
−0.041**
(0.006)
(0.016)
(0.016)
23–25 years
(0.007)
(0.014) (0.016)
State FEs
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Exog. controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Mean reenlist
0.504
0.700
0.563
0.540
0.558
0.575
R2
0.079
0.046
0.081
0.106
0.082
0.093
N
98,221
21,967
18,103
126,965
19,493
36,091
Standard Errors Clustered at the State Home of Record Level
*** < 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1

(7)
High school
−0.013*
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
0.530
0.096
109,377

NOTE: Regression results in the interaction row estimate the dependent mandate’s effect on reenlistment
rates for soldiers aged 23–25 after the law passed in March 2010. Demographic controls include ethnicity,
gender, and education level. In our sample, 54.27 percent of soldiers reenlist conditional on the army
offering reenlistment. We use data from 2007–2013 unless otherwise noted.
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Table 6: Placebo Test Results
(1)
Reenlisted
2009–2012
23–25 years × post ACA

(2)
Reenlisted
2006–2009

(3)
Reenlisted
27–30 years vs.
32–34 years

(4)
Reenlisted
19–20 years vs.
21–23 years

−0.025∗∗∗
(0.009)

23–25 years × post 2007

-0.000
(0.008)

27–30 years × post ACA

0.004
(0.012)

18–20 years × post ACA

0.057
(0.049)

State FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Exog. controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Rank & branch FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
R2

56,643
66,029
20,190
0.089
0.092
0.098
Standard Errors Clustered at the State Home of Record Level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

42,884
0.176

NOTE: Regression results in the interaction row estimate the dependent mandate’s effect on
reenlistment rates for soldiers aged 23–25 after the law passed in March 2010. Demographic
controls include ethnicity, gender, and education level. In our sample, 54.27 percent of
soldiers reenlist conditional on the army offering reenlistment. We use data from 2007–
2013 unless otherwise noted.
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Table 7: Robustness-Enactment and Implementation of ACA
(1)
(2)
Reenlisted Reenlisted
full sample w/o 2010
23–25 years × post ACA

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)

(3)
Reenlisted
enact vs. implement

−0.021∗∗∗
(0.007)

23–25 years × enact

−0.020
(0.012)
−0.025∗∗∗
(0.006)

23–25 years × implement
State FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Exog. controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Rank & branch FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations
138,043
118,600
138,043
2
R
0.070
0.065
0.071
Standard Errors Clustered at the State Home of Record Level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Regression results in the interaction row estimate the dependent mandate’s effect on reenlistment rates for soldiers aged 23–25 after the law passed
in March 2010. Demographic controls include ethnicity, gender, and education
level. In our sample, 54.27 percent of soldiers reenlist conditional on the army
offering reenlistment. We use data from 2007–2013 unless otherwise noted.
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43
Yes

Rank & branch FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

−0.039
(0.090)

0.136
(0.116)

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)

(3)
Reenlisted

Yes

Yes

Yes

−0.000
(0.000)

−0.000
(0.000)

−0.030∗∗∗
(0.007)

(4)
Reenlisted

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.047∗∗∗
(0.002)

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)

(5)
Reenlisted

138,043
0.069

Yes

Yes

Yes

−0.005
(0.007)

0.052∗∗∗
(0.005)

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)

(6)
Reenlisted

NOTE: Regression results in the interaction row estimate the dependent mandate’s effect on reenlistment rates
for soldiers aged 23–25 after the law passed in March 2010. Demographic controls include ethnicity, gender, and
education level. In our sample, 54.27 percent of soldiers reenlist conditional on the army offering reenlistment.
We use data from 2007–2013 unless otherwise noted.

135,184
135,184
138,043
138,043
138,043
0.069
0.069
0.070
0.070
0.069
Standard Errors Clustered at the State Home of Record Level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Yes

Exog. controls

Observations
R2

Yes

0.107
(0.071)

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.007)

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)

State FEs

23–25 years × Medicaid

Expanded Medicaid

23–25 years × casualties

Casualties

23–25 years × unemployment

Unemployment

23–25 years × post ACA

(2)
Reenlisted

(1)
Reenlisted

Table 8: Robustness-Controlling for Youth Unemployment, War on Terror Casualties, and Medicaid Expansion

Table 9: Robustness-States with Preexisting Dependent Mandates
(1)
Reenlisted
full sample

(2)
Reenlisted
w/o Illinois

(3)
Reenlisted
w/o Depend.
Mandate States

(4)
Reenlisted
w/ Depend.
Mandate States

−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)

−0.025∗∗∗
(0.006)

−0.020∗∗
(0.008)

−0.030∗∗∗
(0.007)

State FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Exog. controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Rank & branch FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

23–25 years × post ACA

Observations
R2

138,043
133,107
85,658
0.070
0.070
0.073
Standard Errors Clustered at the State Home of Record Level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

52,385
0.066

NOTE: Regression results in the interaction row estimate the dependent mandate’s effect on
reenlistment rates for soldiers aged 23–25 after the law passed in March 2010. Demographic
controls include ethnicity, gender, and education level. In our sample, 54.27 percent of
soldiers reenlist conditional on the army offering reenlistment. We use data from 2007–
2013 unless otherwise noted.
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Table 10: Post 9-11 GI Bill Usage
(1)
PGIB Use

(2)
PGIB Use

(3)
PGIB Use

(4)
PGIB Use

0.010∗∗
(0.005)

0.011∗∗
(0.005)

0.011∗∗
(0.005)

0.011∗∗
(0.005)

State FEs

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Exog. Controls

No

No

Yes

Yes

Rank & Branch FEs

No

No

No

Yes

23-25 Years × Post ACA

Observations
146,639
146,639
146,639
146,453
2
R
0.003
0.009
0.024
0.028
Standard Errors Clustered at the State Home of Record Level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Regression results in the interaction row estimate the Dependent Mandate’s effect on reenlistment rates for soldiers ages 23-25 after the law passed
in March, 2010. Demographic controls include ethnicity, gender, and education
level. In our sample, 54.27 percent of soldiers reenlist conditional on the army
offering reenlistment. We use data from 2007 to 2013 unless otherwise noted.
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